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BOOK REVIEWS
Theism and Explanation, by Gregory Dawes. London: Routledge, 2009. 
Pp. 211. $95 (hardcover).
MICHAEL ALMEIDA, University of Texas at San Antonio
Richard Lewontin observed that our explanations of material phenomena 
exclude any role for supernatural demons, witches, and spirits of any kind, 
including the gods from Adonai to Zeus. Lewontin, it is worth noting, does 
not say that such explanations preclude such a role. It is the central aim of 
Theism and Explanation to consider, on the contrary, whether explanations 
of material phenomena might include a role for divine action.
The question I am addressing can be variously described. Could any account 
of divine action have explanatory force? Could the existence and action of a 
divine agent be the primary causal factor in a satisfactory explanation? Or, 
to put it crudely, even if all this talk about God were true, could it explain 
anything? If the answer to these questions is no, then it is not only scientists 
that have good reason to be methodological naturalists. We all do. (4)
But the questions this nicely written work aims to answer are not merely 
about the very possibility of a theistic explanation. The question is not 
merely whether “a proposed religious explanation by its very nature lacks 
explanatory force,” but also whether “even if there could in principle ex-
ist a respectable religious explanation, natural explanations would still be 
preferable” (6–7). These are respectively the in principle and de facto ques-
tions for theistic explanation.
Dawes aims to answer the in principle and de facto questions concern-
ing theistic explanation via an examination of explanation in general. The 
discussion is very accessible but regrettably casual. The concept of expla-
nation is among the most highly refined in the literature and, in general, 
it receives quite rigorous treatment. So, it’s unexpected that, for instance, 
Dawes’s proposed, potential, and actual explanations are not distinguished 
with much precision. It might be that he prefers to err on the side of accessi-
bility and brevity, but the tradeoff is considerable. A proposed explanation, 
for instance, is defined as nothing more than a proposition that someone 
as a matter of fact considers to be explanatory and an actual explanation is 
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defined as a potential explanation that is true (21). Potential explanations 
receive somewhat more attention.
Initially, we find a potential explanation H of surprising fact E to be 
any hypothesis H on which E is not surprising or on which E is a matter 
of course (21). But call to mind any improbable event that is not surpris-
ing. It is not surprising, for instance, that E = I draw an ace from a fair and 
complete deck of cards. But it is unlikely. Since E is not surprising, it is not 
surprising on the hypothesis H = I sneeze before drawing the card. But it 
is hard to see how sneezing might count as a potential explanation of why 
I drew an ace.
Dawes precisifies the initial suggestion with the subjunctive proposal 
that a potential explanation H of fact E is such that were H true, then E 
would not be surprising or would be intelligible, and he considers the con-
ditions under which we might be justified in accepting a potential explana-
tion. The initial proposal is that we should accept the potential explanation 
H of E just in case conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied.
(i) P(H | E & k) > .5,
and
(ii) There is no other hypothesis H' such that P(H' | E & k) > P(H | E & k).
We ought to accept the potential explanation H of surprising fact E just in 
case H makes E more likely than not, and there is no competing hypoth-
esis H’ that makes E more likely than H does.
This proposal is puzzling for a variety of reasons. Dawes urges that (i) and 
(ii) might set the standards for acceptable explanation too high. But that’s 
not the central problem here. The central problem is that the satisfaction of 
(i) and (ii) is irrelevant to Dawes’s preferred analysis of potential explana-
tion. Recall that Dawes recommends that a potential explanation H of fact 
E is such that were H true, then E would not be surprising. If we let □→ be 
our subjunctive conditional operator, then it seems that a potential expla-
nation would be acceptable only if (iii) were satisfied.
(iii) P(H □→ E) > .5
According to (iii), the probability that it would be true that E, were it true 
that H, is greater than .5. If (iii) is true, then E would be (perhaps) unsur-
prising were H true. But the value of (iii) has nothing to do with the values 
of (i) and (ii). To offer one example, suppose we let H = you choose a red or 
green ball from the urn and let E = you choose a ball from the urn. Suppose 
there are no red or green balls in the urn. Under these conditions, P(H | 
E & k) = 0 and so (i) and (ii) are both false while (iii) is clearly true. The 
probabilities of subjunctive conditions are not conditional probabilities.
Of course the difficulties are compounded here. Were the value of (iii) 
equivalent to the value of some conditional probability, one would expect 
it to be (iv) and not (ii).
(iv) P(E | H & k) > .5
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But the value of (iii) is not equivalent to (iv), either.1 So it is unclear why 
Dawes even considers conditional probabilities as acceptance conditions 
given his preferred analysis of potential explanations.
The discussion of specifically theistic explanations focuses on the pro-
posal that such explanations are theoretical, intentional and abductive or 
arguments to the best explanation. Theistic explanations are theoretical, 
on Dawes’s account, since they posit the existence of an unobservable 
agent. To this extent, theistic explanations have a feature in common with 
explanations in the hard sciences that posit unobservables. But theistic 
explanations also appeal to the intentional actions of a divine being in 
bringing about or causing what we observe (39). Dawes consistently com-
pares theistic explanation to explanations in the hard sciences. But since 
theistic explanation is intentional, on Dawes’s account, the more illumi-
nating comparison would have been with psychological explanations, or 
explanations in anthropology or sociology. Alternatively, a comparison 
to sciences in which teleological explanation is not so foreign—biological 
sciences, for instance—would have been instructive. But there is almost 
no discussion of these sciences. To the extent that we get successful ex-
planations in the biological sciences or the soft sciences, we should find 
congenial the possibility of successful theistic explanation.
It is also noteworthy that there is no mention of the principle of suffi-
cient reason in a monograph focusing on theistic explanation. It is equal-
ly strange that there’s little discussion of the apparent (though perhaps 
misleading) consistency of theistic and naturalistic explanation. Theistic 
explanation appeals to the aims, goals or purposes God might have in 
bringing about some event or state of affairs E. Such explanations offer 
something close to a teleological explanation or explanation in terms of 
final causation. The obvious question is how an explanation for E in terms 
of final causation might conflict with an explanation for E in terms of ef-
ficient causation. The assumption throughout is that these explanations 
are not consistent or are otherwise in tension. But where precisely is the 
inconsistency? Comparison with the soft sciences on this point is helpful. 
The complete natural explanation for why Smith raised his hand tells us 
nothing of Smith’s aims, goals or purposes. On the other hand, it clearly 
does not entail that there are no goals, aims or purposes. Nothing in the 
logic of explanation generates an inconsistency on the assumption that 
both explanations are true.
According to Dawes, a successful theistic explanation is one that more 
or less satisfies a set of explanatory virtues (115). He sets out a set of well-
known virtues such as testability, simplicity, ontological economy, and 
1Here’s a small example. Suppose every item in the urn is red and no one chooses an item. 
Let H = S chooses an item from the urn and E = the item is green. The value of (iv) is then 
zero. But it might also be true that had anyone chosen an item from the urn, it would have 
contained only green items. It’s perfectly possible that I’d have known about it and replaced 
all the red items with green ones. In that case the value of (iii) is certainty. 
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informativeness, and offers some informal discussion on how a theistic 
explanation might rise to the standard of success. Dawes concludes,
if on a number of the criteria we give the theist the benefit of the doubt, we 
cannot exclude the bare possibility that there might one day exist a suc-
cessful theistic explanation. As things stand, for instance, proposed theistic 
explanations are not consistent with the rest of our knowledge. (144)
But, again, how so? Are the conclusions of theistic proofs excluded a priori 
from “our knowledge”? Do we know that the full range of a posteriori 
and a priori arguments for God’s existence fail to yield anything rising to 
the level of knowledge? Is non-inferential knowledge of God ruled out 
as well? As we’ve already noted, intentional theistic explanations do not 
conflict with naturalistic explanations in any obvious way; they do not 
conflict any more than explanations in terms of purposes for events con-
flict with explanations in terms of efficient causes for events. So we are 
left with no obvious way in which proposed theistic explanations are sup-
posed to be inconsistent with what we know.
Theism and Explanation is undeniably a well-written and highly accessible 
book. Dawes’s approach to theories of explanation in general, and theistic 
explanation in particular, makes for easy reading. The tradeoff is that the 
details of his account of explanation, theistic and otherwise, lose some clar-
ity and the discussion loses some depth. The tension between naturalistic 
and theistic explanations, for instance, is not obvious. And the motivation 
for offering a theistic explanation—which might have been found in some 
version of the principle of sufficient reason—is obscure. But for readers in-
terested in an introduction to some of these important and complex issues, 
Theism and Explanation offers an easy way into the discussion.
Which Trinity? Whose Monotheism? Philosophical and Systematic Theologians 
on the Metaphysics of Trinitarian Theology, by Thomas McCall. Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 2010. Pp. 256. $30 (paperback).
DALE TUGGY, SUNY Fredonia
This is a unique, stimulating and yet unsatisfying book which should be 
widely read. The answers to the questions in the title, respectively: (1) ei-
ther a “social” or a constitution theory, (2) Richard Bauckham’s. McCall is 
a theologian well versed in analytic philosophy. This book attempts, with 
some success, to bridge the cultural, intellectual, and institutional divides 
between Christian philosophers and theologians. McCall notes that the 
book “will at points be less than satisfying to partisans in both camps” (8).
In chapter 1, he nicely summarizes much recent positive work on Trinity 
theories by Christian philosophers, as well as some anti-“social”-theory 
arguments. In the next two chapters he sets out to correct the oversights 
and misunderstandings of various of these philosophers by endorsing 
